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CONTACT REPORT

PROJECT OR ACTIVITY ( )

DATE OF REPORT 20 July 1953

1. PARTICIPANTS: ( ) OGATA - ( )
2. DATE AND PLACE OF CONTACT: 18 July 1953 - Pine Room of Imperial Hotel.
3. Luncheon originally scheduled for 1200 hours - ( ) called to postpone till 1230 since OGATA tied up in committee meeting in Diet. ( ) - ( ) - ( ) met in lobby at 1230 by ( ) - went directly to Pine Room to await OGATA's arrival. During the delay ( ) told an interesting account of the surreptitious entry of a Japanese citizen, (former Kempeitai member) into the Prime Minister's residence. He scaled a twenty foot wall, walked past a sentry box with a sleeping guard in it, entered the third story of the house via a fire escape, made friends with a dog he found in the house, went down to the second story, passed the room of the Prime Minister's maid (asleep) and then the secretary (also asleep), entered the Prime Minister's bedroom where the Prime Minister was sleeping so soundly he did not want to disturb him, entered the Prime Minister's bathroom where he shaved with the Prime Minister's razor, entered the Prime Minister's study, smoked three cigarettes, tried to find some writing paper, couldn't, went back to bathroom where he reeled off a supply of toilet paper, returned to study and wrote a letter, sat in study for some time, at 0600 when maid came upstairs he asked her to get a policeman and take him away. Also he pushed a buzzer by mistake. Nothing happened.
4. OGATA arrived about 1300. Had a cup of tea. Polite exchanges for two or three minutes and then lunch without further delay. Creamed tomato soup - rolls - New York steak (medium) - buttered fried potatoes - fresh string beans - stewed egg plant - tomato, cucumber and lettuce salad - French dressing - fresh fruit and whipped cream dessert - fresh plums and peaches - coffee. Beer was also served.
5. Conversation during early part of the lunch was concerned with a number of current topics, not particularly pertinent to the meeting but of some interest.
  - a. OGATA mentioned President Eisenhower's association with Marshal Grigori K. Zhukov at the end of the war in Berlin, and asked if Zhukov's recent appointment to a more responsible position in the USSR was not of some special significance. (OGATA seemed comparatively well briefed on the present Soviet situation.) ( ) stated that the appointment was of interest but that he had heard Zhukov had even more recently been ousted. This was news to OGATA. Subject dropped.
  - b. OGATA asked if it was true that Secretary of State Dulles had recently been in Europe. ( ) answered in the negative. OGATA stated that there was a rumor prevalent in Japan that John Foster Dulles was in Europe at the time of the outbreak of uprisings in East Germany, and that it was felt that

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**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

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the Americans had called signals on that fracas. ( ) replied that he was certain Dulles had not been in Europe at the time, and that it would be untrue to say the U. S. had instigated the European uprising against the Communists. ( ) stated that it was only common sense that the U. S. had had a great deal to do with it. ( ) commented that it would be less than true if it were said we didn't try. Subject dropped.

c. ( ) commented (with a smile and a glance toward OGATA) that he planned to attend the Moral Re-armament Conference in Switzerland this summer. (NOTE: He had previously stated to ( ) and ( ) that this was approved by OGATA.) ( ) stated to ( ) that ( ) might return to Japan from Europe via the United States, and that ( ) might meet him there for a few days -- if it was all right with Mr. OGATA. OGATA commented, perhaps facetiously, that it was not a "completely all right thing." (daijibu denai desu) He commented with a smile that he didn't think MURAI was a very good representative for Moral Re-armament. There was some small talk about morals and moral re-armament and MURAI, and the gay ladies of Paris. Subject dropped.

d. Mention was made of a possible trip to the United States by the Prime Minister or OGATA. ( ) stated that he sincerely felt it would be a great thing for OGATA to visit the U. S., and from an authoritative point of view, share opinions and orientation with U. S. leaders. OGATA indicated little likelihood of his actually being able to get away -- at least in the immediate future.

e. OGATA stated that as soon as the Diet passed the current budget bill he hoped that he would be able to introduce a bill for the purpose of legislating into being an intelligence organization. He stated that he hoped to have our guidance in this matter and cited that as one reason why he was doubtful about ( ) leaving at this time for a trip to Europe.

f. OGATA commented that greater efforts were necessary to develop SEA. He stated Japan was working toward this end and that he felt this was a great field for cooperative endeavor between the U. S. and Japan vis a vis SEA. He noted that although many elements in SEA had won their political freedom they lacked the monetary backing and business know-how to develop their countries properly. He said he hoped the U. S. would see fit to provide considerable aid to SEA in helping them get on their feet. He said that if Japan and the U. S. could provide strength and prosperity in SEA it would go a long way in balancing the present world situation. (NOTE: It appeared that OGATA desired to make a point here.) ( ) indicated a sympathetic ear on the part of the U. S. Government to such a plan, and mentioned the opinion that although there was a general cut back of U. S. aid abroad it is likely that the free portion of Asia may expect continued aid and assistance. ( ) asked if this would apply to Korea. ( ) said he wasn't aware of the contents of any agreement, but he felt that it must and should be included. It was agreed in passing that Rhee is a difficult man to deal with (something the Japanese, of course, have felt for a long time).

g. ( ) made the point that he hoped the Japanese Government would realize that the climate is right now for U. S. aid to Japan. He went on

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to state quite frankly that such a climate would not last forever, and that several American leaders, including the Ambassador, sincerely hoped that the Japanese would find a way to take advantage of the present situation. OGATA reviewed some of the well known reasons for lack of more positive action on the Japanese side. ( ) stated that he felt that most American leaders fully understand Japan's current problem, but all fervently hope the Japanese leaders can find a solution without much further delay. He made the point that he hoped the Japanese could do more in developing a favorable climate amongst the Japanese people, eliminating anti-Americanism and making clear to the Japanese people the legitimate need for military and other aid.

6. OGATA then stated ~~stated~~ that with the conclusion of a truce in Korea there emerged two problems for Japan, re-armament and a psychological warfare program. This latter program was the important point of today's meeting. ( ) stated that it was the U. S. Government's intention to work together with the Japanese in a manner to assure the accomplishment of the aims of both governments in Japan. (Lunch finished -- party moved to more comfortable chairs at the other end of the room.) ( ) stated that he had gone over the outline of OGATA's plan which ( ) had provided for him and indicated that he was pleased to see that it included a policy committee which should be able to insure continuity of program and validity of policy regardless of the make up of the Cabinet. OGATA stated that he felt that the matter was still in the study and analysis stage, but that he was keenly interested in the matter. He thought for a moment and then said, "I am the responsible person for this matter (sekeninsha). However, to begin with I would like to have ( ) together with ( ) study the present situation and make recommendations." He added, "Of course, there would be eventually appointed a responsible executive on the Japanese side." (Inferring that it would not be ( )) ( ) stated that on the American side he was planning to cause to be found a policy committee which would serve to provide continuity of effort and direction as a counter part to the Japanese side. When it was explained that it was not expected that the committee would sit with the Japanese policy group, and that its purpose was not to direct Japanese activity, OGATA concurred completely. It was agreed that MURAI and ( ) would review the PW plan and problem and pass appropriate recommendations. Steps would be taken to develop policy direction groups on both sides (presumably at once by U. S. side and after recommendations were completed on the Japanese side.) OGATA received a telephone call and had to leave the room.
7. Upon return it was apparent that OGATA had to excuse himself. At this point ( ) asked one more question. He cited the recent letter from OGATA in which it stated that OGATA and the Prime Minister were aware of "certain activities of one of their colleagues" and asked, "Would these activities be included in this new program the Deputy Prime Minister had in mind?" There was immediately a sense of confusion registered by OGATA. ( ) in an aside said -- "The activities of KIMURA". OGATA then said that he did not know anything about the activities of KIMURA -- he had never been briefed. ( ) commented that they were, of course, part of the overall fight against Communism and they wondered if they might not be included in any new program. OGATA repeated that he did not know anything about them but

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felt they should be studied to determine whether or not they should be part of the new overall endeavor. There was obvious confusion in these last comments — it is the writer's opinion that it may have been calculated on OGATA's part.

8. OGATA excused himself at appointed 1415 hours. The meeting ended.

cpd in Ogata dossier